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Abstract—In this letter, we consider downlink transmission of
a multiuser multiple-input multiple-output (MU-MIMO) system
with zero-forcing (ZF) precoders in the presence of multiple
attackers. We propose a cooperative pilot spoofing attack (CPSA),
where the attackers collaboratively impair the channel estima-
tions in the uplink channel training phase, aiming at deteriorating
the downlink thoughput of the whole cell. We first evaluate the
impacts of CPSA on the channel estimation and the downlink ZF
precoding design, and then we derive an analytical expression for
the achievable downlink sum-rate. Furthermore, we investigate
the optimal attack strategy to minimize the achievable downlink
sum-rate. We show that the optimization problem under consid-
eration is a convex one so the global optimum could be obtained
conveniently. Numerical results show that the CPSA attack results
in a severe performance deterioration with the increase in the
attacking power and the number of attackers.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, pilot spoofing, achievable
downlink sum-rate, convex optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
MU-MIMO is the most promising manner of exploiting
the spatial degrees of freedom provided by multiple-antennas
at the base station (BS) [1]. To fully exploit benefits of
MU-MIMO, accurate channel state information (CSI) is a
prerequisite. In practice, the CSI needs to be estimated. In
a time-division duplex (TDD) system, the BS estimates the
CSI based on the uplink pilot signals due to the reciprocity of
the uplink and downlink channels [2].
However, this specific pilot transmission mechanism is
vulnerable to malicious interference from active attackers. In
particular, the malicious attacker can attack the uplink pilot
transmission by sending the same pilot signals as legitimate
users, which is also known as pilot spoofing attack (PSA)
[3], [4]. PSA may lead to incorrect channel estimations and
consequently reduce the wireless thoughput of legitimate users
in the whole cell significantly.
Recently, PSA has attracted a lot of research interest [5]-
[8]. In [5], the authors studied the impact of a PSA launched
by a single-antenna attacker in a single user scenario, where
analysis showed that this attack could drastically weaken
the strength of the received signal at the legitimate user.
Extreme cases were considered where the number of transmit
antennas and the attackers power were very large. In [6],
the authors investigated a PSA launched by a multi-antenna
attacker in a multi-cell multiuser massive MIMO system, and
they found that the attacker could conduct a best possible
PSA by maximizing the total average estimation error variance
of the desired users channel, because the leakage of the
desired signal would increase when the channel estimation
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error increased. In [7], the authors studied a combined PSA
in a single-cell massive MIMO system, and the downlink
transmission rates in the presence of the attack was derived
by exploiting the channel hardening effect. In [8], the authors
investigated the design of a PSA carried out by multiple single-
antenna attackers in a single user scenario. They constructed an
optimization problem from the point of view of the attackers,
which aimed to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and
information leakage to a target adversary.
However, all these aforementioned works are limited either
within a single attacker [5]–[7] or focusing the impact on a
single specific user [5], [8]. In fact, on one hand, the PSA
may effect all users in the whole cell, which may deteriorate
the cell performance severely. On the other hand, since the
user access protocol is publicly known, multiple attackers
can synchronized to the BS and lauch collaborative attack to
improve their PSA capabilities1. So far, a study on a general
PSA scenario with multiple users and multiple attackers is
still absent, so the ultimate impact of PSA to a MU-MIMO
in a cell for multiple users has not been clearly exposed yet.
Although the analysis presented in [7] is in this line but it
assumes the channel hardening property so it does not hold
for moderately large number of transmit antennas (dozens of
antennas), which is a more practical scenario.
In this letter, we consider a MU-MIMO system under the
PSA lauched by multiple cooperative attackers, and investigate
how multiple attackers can cooperatively perform the PSA
to deteriorate the cell performance. Especially, 1) we first
evaluate the impacts of CPSA on the channel estimation and
the downlink ZF precoding design, and then we derive an
analytical expression for the achievable downlink sum-rate.
2) Furthermore, we investigate the optimal attack strategy,
which aims at minimizing the achievable downlink sum-rate.
We show that this problem under consideration is a convex
optimization problem so the global optimum could be obtained
conveniently. 3) Our results show that the CPSA results in a
severe performance deterioration for the whole cell. Several
cooperative attackers could drive the sum-rate down to only
30% of the normal thoughput without attack.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. System Model
We consider a single-cell multiuser TDD communication
system, where an M -antenna BS serves K single-antenna
users using orthogonal pilot sequences for channel training,
i.e., pk ∈ C
τp×1 is the pilot sequence of the kth user satisfying
pTk p
∗
k = 1 with the length τP . In this letter, we consider a
1In practice, the attackers can be connected to each other via low-cost
low-capacity wireless links, so they can share their CSIs for collaboration.
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Fig. 1: System model with multiple cooperative attackers.
CPSA, as illustrated in Fig. 1, where N single-antenna attack-
ers collaborate to send multiusers pilot sequences combination
to disturb the uplink channel training. Since the initial access
and pilot transmission protocol are publicly known [5], each
attacker could easily synchronize with the BS and replicates
the same pilot signals to confound the BS cooperatively.
We use hB,k ∈ C
M×1 and hA,n ∈ C
M×1 to denote the
channel from the kth user and the nth attacker to BS, respec-
tively. In particular, hB,k =
√
βB,kgB,k, hA,n =
√
βA,ngA,n,
where βB,k and βA,n denote the large-scale fadings, gB,k ∈
C
M×1 and gA,n ∈ C
M×1 are the small-scale Rayleigh fadings
with each element independent and identical distributed (i.i.d.)
complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit
variance, i.e., gB,k ∼ CN (0, IM ), gA,n ∼ CN (0, IM ).
B. CPSA Scheme
In the CPSA scheme, each attacker target all the users so
the attack signal is a combination of all users pilot signals.
Take the case of the nth attacker, for n = 1, 2, · · · , N , the
attack signal can be expressed as
sAn =
K∑
k=1
√
τpθn,kPAnpk, (1)
where PAn is the attacking power, θn,k is the power allocation
coefficient allocated for attacking the pilot of the kth user for
k = 1, 2, · · · ,K . We can see in (1) that the attackers transmit a
linear combination of all users pilot sequences to confound the
BS. Since the pilot information is publicly known, in this way,
the CPSA scheme does not need to have any prior knowledge
on which pilot sequences are currently used by the legitimate
users, which is more practical.
In the uplink pilot transmission phase, the BS will receive
a pilot signal combination from users and attackers as
YB =
K∑
k=1
√
τpPUkhB,kp
T
k +
N∑
n=1
hA,ns
T
An
+U , (2)
where PUk is the pilot transmission power of the kth user, U
is the additive Gaussian white noise (AWGN) matrix at the
BS with each element being distributed as CN
(
0, σ2
)
.
As these pilot sequences are orthogonal to each other, i.e.,
pHi pk = 0 for i 6= k, the BS can obtain the channel estimation
result of the kth user under a priori knowledge of p∗k by the
following pre-processing
yB,k = (YBp
∗
k)
/(√
τpPUk
)
= hB,k +
N∑
n=1
√
θn,k
PAn
PUk
hA,n +
zB,k√
τpPUk
, (3)
where zB,k is the equivalent noise vector with distribution
CN
(
0, σ2IM
)
. Without awaring the CPSA attack, the BS will
calculate the MMSE estimation of the legitimate channel hB,k
via the standared process as [9]
hˆB,k =ΨB,kΩ
−1
B,kyB,k, (4)
whereΨB,k , E
{
hB,ky
H
B,k
}
, andΩ−1B,k , E
{
yB,ky
H
B,k
}−1
are the covariance matrices, which can be derived as
ΨB,k = βB,kIM ,
ΩB,k = βB,kIM +
N∑
n=1
θn,k (PAn/PUk)βA,nIM
+
(
σ2
/
τpPUk
)
IM ,
The estimated channel vector hˆB,k is distributed as
CN
(
0, RˆB,k
)
with RˆB,k can be written as
RˆB,k = Ψ
H
B,kΩ
−1
B,kΨB,k = λB,kIM , (5)
where
λB,k =
τpPUkβ
2
B,k
τpPUkβB,k + τp
N∑
n=1
θn,kPAnβA,n + σ
2
.
The uncorrelated channel estimation error h˜B,k satisfing
hB,k = hˆB,k + h˜B,k can be derived by invoking the orthog-
onality property of MMSE estimation as
h˜B,k ∼ CN (0, ηB,kIM ) , (6)
where ηB,k , βB,k − λB,k.
Remark 1: Note that the attackers can also transmit Gaussian
random interference to degrade the accuracy of the channel
estimation. However, as shown in our previous works [8], [10],
transmitting random interference can not offer any advantage
over the proposed pilot spoofing signals, which will be shown
later in numerical results.
III. DOWNLINK SUM-RATE ANALYSIS AND OPTIMAL
ATTACK STRATEGY
A. Downlink ZF Beamforming
Since ZF downlink beamforming is an asympototically op-
timal solution for MU-MISO transmission2 Here we consider
2ZF precoding can achieve asymptotically optimal throughput in the down-
link of MU-MISO system, which has been proved in [11], [12].
ZF beamformer for the BS, which is
wk
∆
=
aB,k
‖aB,k‖
, (7)
for the kth user, where aB,k is the kth column of
HˆB
(
HˆHB HˆB
)−1
, and HˆB , [hˆB,1, · · · , hˆB,K ] is the chan-
nel estimation matrix. Due to the CPSA, the BS uses the
impaired ZF precoder for downlink data transmission. The
received signal at the kth user can be written as
yk =
√
PBkh
H
B,kwksk +
K∑
i=1,i6=k
√
PBih
H
B,kwisi + zk, (8)
where PBk is the transmit power allocated for the kth user,
and zk ∼ CN
(
0, σ2
)
is the additive noise at the kth user.
As discussed in [13], without the dedicate downlink channel
training, the users only have statistical effective channel gain
for signal demodulation, and the signal received at the kth user
can be reformulated as3
yk =
√
PBkE
{
hHB,kwk
}
sk
+
√
PBk
(
hHB,kwk − E
{
hHB,kwk
})
sk
+
K∑
i=1,i6=k
√
PBih
H
B,kwisi + zk, (9)
where due to the incorrect ZF precoding caused by CPSA,
inter-user interference occurs, which will greatly deteriorate
the overall throughput in the cell.
B. Achievable Downlink Sum-Rate
The achievable downlink rate at the k user can be given by
Rk = log (1 + γk) , (10)
where
γk =
PBk
∣∣∣E{hHB,kwk}∣∣∣2
PBkVar
{
hHB,kwk
}
+
K∑
i=1,i6=k
PBiE
{∣∣∣hHB,kwi∣∣∣2
}
+ σ2
,
and E {·} and Var {·} are the expectation and variance oper-
ators, respectively.
To simplify the subsequent analysis, we assume in the
uplink pilot transmission phase PU = PUk , and PA = PAn
for all k and n. In addition, in the downlink data transmission
phase, PB = PBk . Then, the achievable downlink rate at the
kth user can be derived as follows.
Theorem 1. Under the CPSA and ZF precoding, the achiev-
able downlink rate at the kth user is
R˜k = log
(
1 +
Ak
Bk + CkνTθk
)
, (11)
where θk , [θ1,k, · · · , θN,k]
T
, ν , [βA,1, · · · , βA,N ]
T , Ak ,
ξ (M −K + 1) τpPUβ
2
B,k, Bk , (M − 2K + 1− ξ (M−
3In the absence of downlink channel training, statistical CSI is used by
each user for signal detection. This is a standard detection scheme, and has
been widely adopted in [13]–[15].
−K + 1)) τpPUβ
2
B,k+
(
KβB,k + σ
2/PB
) (
τpPUβB,k + σ
2
)
,
Ck ,
(
KβB,k + σ
2/PB
)
τpPA, ξ (x) , Γ (x+ 1/2)/Γ (x).
Proof: By calculating the following three terms in γk in
(10), the derivation of the achievable downlink rate at the kth
user is outlined.
For the numerator
∣∣∣E{hHB,kwk}∣∣∣2, it can be calculated by
∣∣E{hHB,kwk}∣∣2 (a)= ∣∣∣E{(hˆHB,k + h˜HB,k)wk}∣∣∣2
(b)
= |E {1/‖aB,k‖}|
2
(c)
= ξ (M −K + 1)λB,k, (12)
where ξ (x) , Γ (x+ 1/2)/Γ (x), step (a) is obtained by
applying the MMSE channel estimation error model, step (b)
holds since h˜B,k and wk are uncorrelated, and hˆ
H
B,kwk =
1/‖aB,k‖, and step (c) results from the Gamma distribution.
Var
{
hHB,kwk
}
in denominator can be computed by
Var
{
hHB,kwk
} (a)
= E
{∣∣hHB,kwk∣∣2}− ∣∣E{hHB,kwk}∣∣2
(b)
= E
{∣∣∣hˆHB,kwk∣∣∣2
}
+ E
{∣∣∣h˜HB,kwk∣∣∣2
}
−
∣∣∣E{hˆHB,kwk}∣∣∣2
(c)
= E
{∣∣∣h˜HB,kwk∣∣∣2
}
+ Var
{
hˆHB,kwk
}
(d)
= ηB,k + (M −K + 1− ξ (M −K + 1))λB,k, (13)
where step (a) is obtained by applying the definition of
variance, step (b) holds since hˆB,k and h˜B,k are independent
of each other, step (c) is obtained by applying the definition
of variance, and step (d) holds since h˜B,k and wk are
uncorrelated.
The term
K∑
i=1,i6=k
E
{∣∣∣hHB,kwi∣∣∣2
}
in denominator is
K∑
i=1,i6=k
E
{∣∣hHB,kwi∣∣2} = K∑
i=1,i6=k
E
{∣∣∣(hˆHB,k + h˜HB,k)wi∣∣∣2
}
(a)
=
K∑
i=1,i6=k
[
E
{∣∣∣hˆHB,kwi∣∣∣2
}
+ E
{∣∣∣h˜HB,kwi∣∣∣2
}]
(b)
=
K∑
i=1,i6=k
E
{∣∣∣h˜HB,kwi∣∣∣2
}
= (K − 1) ηB,k, (14)
where step (a) results form the independence of hˆB,k and
h˜B,k, and step (b) holds since hˆ
H
B,kwi = 0 for i 6= k.
Substituing (5), (12), (13) and (14) into (10) yields the
expression (11). This completes the proof. 
Accordingly, the achievable downlink sum-rate is
Rsum =
K∑
k=1
R˜k =
K∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
Ak
Bk + CkνTθk
)
.
Remark 2: Note that the achievable downlink sum-rate does
not depend on the small-scale fading components gB,k and
gA,n, which implies that the attackers could optimize the
attack without the legitimate CSI. This makes CPSA a more
practical attacking scheme.
C. Optimal Attack Strategy
The goal of the CPSA is to minimize the achievable
downlink sum-rate of the target cell by allocating the attacking
power. This strategy could be formulated as follows
min
θk
K∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
Ak
Bk + CkνTθk
)
,
s.t. C1: 0 6 θn,k 6 1, n = 1, 2, · · · , N,
C2:
K∑
k=1
θn,k 6 1
(15)
where the constraints C1 and C2 account for the attacking
power sum and individual constraints.
Fortunately, we declear that the optimization problem is a
convex problem. Denote f (θk) , Bk/Ak + (Ck/Ak)ν
Tθk.
The first and second derivative of f (θk) can be derived as
df(θk)
dθk
= (Ck/Ak)ν and
d2f(θk)
dθkdθ
T
k
= 0N , respectively, where
0N denotes a N ×N null matrix. According to the necessary
and sufficient condition of convex function identification,
f (θk) is a convex function. Due to log (1 + 1/x) is convex,
we conclude that the composite function log (1 + 1/f (θk)) is
a convex function of θk. Considering that the summation of
convex functions is convex, C1 and C2 are convex sets, we
can proof the optimization problem is convex. So, it can be
efficiently solved by standard convex optimization techniques.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We evaluate the impact of CPSA to the achievable downlink
sum-rate through numerical results. We use β = L0d
−α to
model the path loss and shadowing fading, where d is the
distance between the BS and the user, L0 = −45 dB and
α = 3.7 is the path loss exponent. The users and attackers
are uniformly distributed in a circular cell. The inner radius
is 50m, the maximum distance of the users is 400m and that
of the attackers is DmaxA . We consider communication over
a 20 MHz bandwidth with noise floor of -90 dBm. We set
PU = 10 dBm, PA = 10 dBm and PB = 40 dBm. We set the
pilot sequence length τP = K symbol durations. The results
are averaged over 10000 Monte-Carlo (MC) tests.
Fig. 2 depicts the achievable downlink sum-rate versus
the number of the BS antennas with different number of
the attackers. It shows that the achievable downlink sum-
rate is significantly degraded by the optimal CPSA. As the
number of the attackers increases, the impact becomes more
significant. Moreover, we evaluate the impacts of random
noise jamming attack (i.e., Gaussian random vector with
distribution CN (0, IτP )) and non-optimized CSPA (i.e., the
attacking power allocated to each user is the same without
optimization) as benchmarks. Compared with random noise
jamming attack and the non-optimized CSPA, the achievable
downlink sum-rate is significantly reduced under the optimal
CPSA. These illustrate that the CSPA has severe impact on
the CSI estimation and consequently results in a substantial
thoughput loss.
The impacts of maximum distance DmaxA and the attacking
power PA of the attackers on the cell thoughput are illustrated
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Fig. 2: The downlink achievable sum-rate versus the number of
antennas, where K = 24, DmaxA = 300.
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in Fig. 3. The achievable downlink sum-rate when there is
no attack is taken as a benchmark. We observe that when
the attacks are not so far away from the BS, the achievable
downlink sum-rate has a dramatical deterioration, even there
is only two attackers each with power 5 dBm. In addition,
increasing attack power a little bit also has severely impact on
the whole cell performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we analyzed the impact of CPSA, i.e., a PSA
launched by multiple cooperative attackers. This attack caused
a great impact on the channel estimation in the uplink channel
training phase. We have evaluated the effect of the CPSA on
the achievable downlink sum-rate in a single-cell MU-MIMO
system. We shown that the cooperation among attackers can
significantly improve their offensive capabilities, and impose
dramatic harm to the system throughput. Moreover, it should
be noted that most existing pilot spoofing attack detection
methods are difficult to be used directly for the CPSA in a
MU-MIMO system. For example, random modulation based
methods (e.g., random frequency shift [16]) will incur high
computational complexity for the MU-MIMO system; it is
challenging for statistic feature based methods (e.g., sparsity of
virtual channel [17]) to select the optimal detection threshold
in the face of such cooperative attacks, and they need to
estimate more complicated statistic features when facing the
scenario of multiuser and multiple attackers. Consequently, ef-
fective detection and defense mechanisms are urgently needed,
which is a critical issue for our future research.
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